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Who Speaks for Neuroscience?
Neuroimaging Evidence and
Courtroom Expertise
Jane Campbell Moriarty† & Daniel D. Langleben††
“[T]hose witnesses who succeed in the marketplace for
experts within our adversarial process will often not be those
with the most knowledge or actual expertise in a particular
area, but rather those whom parties believe will succeed in
persuading the factfinder.”1

Preface
Professor Paul Giannelli is a leader in the scholarly field of expert
testimony, inspiring and educating generations of judges, litigants,
students, and fellow academics about the intersection of science and
law and the role of expert witnesses.2 A pioneer in this interdisciplinary area, he has maintained an abiding focus on the importance of
accuracy in scientific evidence and evinced an equally strong commitment to justice in criminal prosecutions. To those ends, Professor
Giannelli has written about the unfairness of criminal defendants
shouldering the burden of proof to establish the unreliability of expert
testimony,3 the need for independent crime labs to resolve the
†

Carol Los Mansmann Chair in Faculty Scholarship and Professor,
Duquesne University School of Law. The title for this article was inspired
by Simon A. Cole’s excellent article, Who Speaks for Science? A Response
to the National Academy of Science’s Report on Forensic Science, 9 J.L.,
Prob., & Risk, 25 (2009). While the phrase “who speaks for science” has
roots old and deep, Professor Cole’s article is an important comment on
the relationship of science and law. Professor Moriarty thanks former and
current law students Emily Bittle, Kristin Hravnak, and Richard Bielawa,
for their research assistance.

††

Daniel D. Langleben, M.D., Professor of Psychiatry, Perelman School of
Medicine, University of Pennsylvania.

1.

Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic
Competence, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 1009, 1011 (2008).

2.

See Paul C. Giannelli et al., Scientific Evidence (5th ed. 2013). The
first edition of this treatise was published in 1986.

3.

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1248
(1980) (arguing that the “prosecution in a criminal case should be required
to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable
doubt” before it is admissible evidence but that in civil cases, by
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problem of “pro-prosecution” experts,4 the right of indigent
defendants to have competent expert assistance,5 the perennial
problem of junk science in criminal cases,6 and the relationship of
legal ethics and expert witnesses.7 He has also been a good friend and
wonderful collaborator with one of the authors of this Article.8 This
Article is in his honor.
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Introduction
This Article explores the issue of proper qualifications necessary
for expert witnesses who testify about structural and functional neuroimaging evidence. It outlines the nature of the problem; explains some
of the complexity of the question of expertise as a matter of medicine,
comparison, the proponent should only need to prove its validity by a
preponderance of the evidence).
4.

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases:
The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L.
439, 441 (1997) (noting that “[t]oo many experts in the criminal justice
system manifest a police-prosecution bias, a willingness to shade or distort
opinions to support the state’s case”); Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and
Forensic Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific
Research, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 53 (arguing in favor of an independent
agency for forensic science).

5.

See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1305 (2004)
(discussing the need for expert witnesses, given the widespread use of
prosecution experts, the increase in types of experts uses, and the problems
of fraud and error in laboratories).

6.

See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 105 (1993); Paul C. Giannelli, Junk Science and the
Execution of an Innocent Man, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 221 (2013).

7.

See Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and
Expert Witnesses, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1493 (2007).

8.

Jane Moriarty is a contributing author to the Fifth Edition of Scientific
Evidence. Giannelli et al., supra note 2.
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science, and law, using criminal cases involving mental health as a
helpful template to discuss the issues; provides some thoughts about
better regulating neuroimaging evidence by focusing on the qualifications of experts; and offers modest policy suggestions to address the
question of expert competence.

I.

Neuroscience, Neuroimaging, and Categorical
Questions About Expertise

Lawyers, judges, legal academics, and the media often use the
term “neuroscience” in a general manner to describe a wide variety of
evidence or information concerning medicine, psychology, and various
disciplines related to the human brain, thought, and behavior.9
Scientists, however, employ a more precise definition of “neuroscience”
as the scientific study of the nervous system.10 The study of neuroscience is remarkably broad, examining many species other than just
humans, and encompasses such diverse fields as experimental neurobiology, cognitive science, and medicine.11 The goals and methods of
the various neuroscience subspecialties differ widely. Those attempting to bring coherence to this transdisciplinary field note the problems
of evaluating the epistemic value of the data, given the methodological, conceptual, and theoretical diversity within and between
the multiple disciplines.12 This multilayered complexity presents challenges for the scientific fields as well as for a legal system grappling
with this developing field of science.
Much of the neuroscience information admitted in court is
generated by structural and functional brain imaging, as explained below. Although neuroimaging scans are admitted into evidence in some
cases, it is the interpretations of the scans that often provide the
critical information, even when the scans themselves are excluded. To
bring a bit more precision to the discussion, we will use the term
“neuroimaging” throughout this article to describe the evidence that
is often at issue in court.

9.

See generally, Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience 9 (2014)
(providing a useful guide for the legal audience under the heading
“Navigating Neuroscience: Who Does What?”).

10.

Boris Kotchoubey et al., Methodological Problems on the Way to
Integrative Human Neuroscience, Frontiers in Integrative Neurosci.,
Nov. 2016, at 1, 2 (quoting About JNeurosci, JNeurosci, http://
www.jneurosci.org/content/about-jneurosci [https://perma.cc/D84G-TM2L]
(last visited Mar. 2, 2018)).

11.

Id. at 4.

12.

Id. at 2.
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One important distinction among numerous techniques used to
image the nervous system is between “structural” and “functional”
imaging. The former is focused on imaging the anatomical structures
and changes that are irreversible or are slow relative to the typical
human-behavioral changes. The latter is focused on transient and reversible changes in the nervous system concurrent with behavior, such
as changes in blood flow or metabolism while pressing a button or
attending to pictures on a screen. Common examples of structural
imaging are X-rays, some forms of Computerized Tomography (“CT”)
scans, and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (“MRI”). Functional neuroimaging is represented by Positron Emission Tomography (“PET”),
Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography (“SPECT”), and
functional MRI (“fMRI”).13 While fMRI has little forensic application
to date, PET, CT, and MRI have been regularly admitted and
collectively constitute nearly two-thirds of the admitted neuroimaging
evidence in criminal cases.14
Contemporary neuroimaging research is multidisciplinary, with
various experts contributing to an aspect of the design, implementation, and interpretation of data. Similarly, medical treatment that
relies on neuroimaging for diagnosis and monitoring generally involves
a team approach in which various specialized physicians and nonphysicians collaborate to order, perform, interpret, and apply the
results of neuroimaging studies, as might occur in head injury or
stroke.
This interplay of specialties presents challenging questions about
how to determine the proper qualifications for witnesses who may testify about the various aspects of neuroimaging evidence. The growth
of neuroimaging as both an area of basic research and as a branch of
clinical diagnostic radiology has blurred the lines between the practice
of medicine and other areas of expertise. While a non-physician would
not be permitted to order or interpret the results of neuroimaging
studies in clinical practice, non-physician experts are asked to testify
about the interpretation of CT, MRI, and PET scans in the courtroom.
MRI and fMRI contributed greatly to the growth on neuroscience
research involving humans, referred to as cognitive, social, and

13.

While Electroencephalography (“EEG”) is categorized as a type of
functional neuroimaging, we do not include it in our discussion here.

14.

Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in the US
Criminal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & Bioscis. 485, 495 (2015).
Professor Farahany’s empirical study of neuroscience and behavioral
genetics in criminal cases indicated PET scans were involved in 18 percent
of cases, CT in 23 percent, and MRI in 24 percent. Id.
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systems neuroscience.15 Both types of MRI have spurred research in
various forms of neuropathology such as traumatic, vascular, or degenerative brain injury that previously required more invasive and
labor-intensive nuclear medicine techniques, such as PET or SPECT.
Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (“BOLD”) fMRI, which
relies on endogenous changes in blood oxygenation rather than injections of contrast materials as a source of contrast, made fMRI safe to
the point where it could be used in studies with risk-benefit ratio that
would not justify using more invasive imaging techniques. Thus,
BOLD fMRI was widely adopted to study basic cognitive processes,
including behavioral regulation and impulsivity, and more complex social functions of morality, altruism, violence, and deception. This research, largely conducted by non-physicians, blurred the divide
between medical research driven by clinical questions and basic science driven by the quest for knowledge.
Much neuroimaging research is funded by government organizations whose mission is to support science that has practical applications. As a result, neuroimaging researchers have been compelled to
highlight the clinical relevance of even the most esoteric and cuttingedge research in papers and grants, despite the fact that clinical applications of fMRI remain few and far between.16 Without question,
this peer-reviewed work has significantly increased our insights into
brain function and dysfunction.17 However, the pressure for continuous
innovation and often-times capricious patterns of biomedical research
funding has had negative consequences as there is little confirmation
of these insights by replication, meta-analyses, and large scale controlled clinical trials.18
Despite the volume of functional neuroimaging studies that are
potentially relevant to the clinical practice of psychiatry, the
15.

See generally Tatjana Aue et al., Great Expectations: What Can fMRI Tell
Us About Psychological Phenomena?, 73 Int’l J. Psychophysiology 10,
10 (2009); Peter A. Bandettini, Twenty Years of Functional MRI: The
Science and the Stories, 62 NeuroImage 575 (2012).

16.

See S. Kapur et al., Why Has it Taken So Long for Biological Psychiatry
to Develop Clinical Tests and What to Do About It?, 17 Molecular
Psychiatry 1174, 1174 (2012).

17.

See generally Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can and What We Cannot
Do with fMRI, 453 Nature 869 (2008); Peter A. Bandettini, What’s New
in Neuroimaging Methods, 1156 Ann. N.Y. Acad. of Sci. 260 (2009).

18.

See e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are
False, 2 PLOS Med. 124, 124 (2005); John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most
Discovered True Associations Are Inflated, 19 Epidemiology 640, 640
(2008); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on
Neuroscience, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 747, 776
(3d ed. 2011); Aue et al., supra, note 15, at 10.
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uncontroversial applications of functional neuroimaging in clinical
psychiatry are limited to the diagnosis of dementia19 and pre-surgical
mapping of the cerebral cortex. These areas are peripheral to psychiatry and are at its intersection with neurology and neurosurgery.
According to the Consensus Report of the American Psychiatric
Association Work Group on Neuroimaging Markers of Psychiatric
Disorders in 2012, “[c]urrently neuroimaging is not recommended
within either the U.S. or European practice guidelines for positively
defining diagnosis of any primary psychiatric disorder.”20 This position
is seconded by influential commentators.21
The ongoing NIH Research Domain Criteria Project (“RDCO”)
initiative aims to develop, for research purposes, “new ways of classifying mental illnesses—based on dimensions of observable behavior
and neurobiological measures.”22 This effort ultimately may lead to a
new clinical classification of mental disorders to match the new
19.

C.f. Susan E. Rushing, Daniel A. Pryma and Daniel D. Langleben, PET
and SPECT, in Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry 4, 20 (Joseph
R. Simpson ed., 2012) (noting that PET is “universally accepted” for
diagnosing dementia and other degenerative brain diseases, and for strokes
and malignancy).

20.

Michael First et al., Consensus Report of the APA Work Group
on Neuroimaging Markers of Psychiatric Disorders: Resource
Document 2 (2012).

21.

See, e.g., James Giordano, Neuoroimaging in Psychiatry: Approaching the
Puzzle as a Piece of the Bigger Picture(s), AJOB Neurosci. Oct.–Dec.
2012, at 54 (2012); James A. Anderson & Judy Illes, Neuroimaging and
Mental Health: Drowning in a Sea of Acrimony, AJOB Neurosci., Oct.–
Dec. 2012, at 42 (2012); Martha J. Farah & Seth J. Gillihan, The Puzzle
of Neuroimaging and Psychiatric Diagnosis: Technology and Nosology in
an Evolving Disipline, AJOB Neurosci. Oct.–Dec. 2012, at 31 (2012);
Jonathan B. Savitz et al., Neuroimaging in Affective Disorders:
Applications in Clinical Research and Forensic Psychiatry, in
Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry 131 (Joseph R. Simpson, ed.,
2012) (recognizing that neuroimaging data with mood disorders has been
effectively applied to a class of individuals but the “the validity of applying
neuroimaging technology to establish the presence of illness in individual
patients remains problematic”); Argyris Stringaris, Editorial: Neuroimaging
in Clincal Psychiatry—When Will the Pay Off Begin?, 56 J. Child
Psychol. & Psychiatry 1263 (2015) (posing questions and providing
answers about the lack of progress in neuroimaging to clinical utility);
Faisal Akram & James Giordano, Research Domain Criteria as Psychiatric
Nosology: Conceptual, Practical and Neuroethical Implications, 26
Clinical NeuroEthics 592 (2017).

22.

NIMH Strategic Plan for Research: Highlight: What Is RCoC?, NIMH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/strategic-planning-reports/highlights/
highlight-what-is-rdoc.shtml [https://perma.cc/WYA7-ES5S] (last visited
Mar. 19, 2018).
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neuroimaging research.23 However, success of this initiative and
subsequent translation into practice is far from guaranteed.24 Much
functional neuroimaging has great potential application for psychiatry
and psychology and there are ongoing efforts to bridge the gap between the research and clinical practice.25 This is a critically
important next step but one that has not yet been taken.
A major concern for the clinical translation of neuroscience research, including functional neuroimaging, is the extrapolation of
group average data from the laboratory to individual patients in the
clinic.26 Nonetheless, the obvious legal and social relevance of functional neuroimaging research has led some to make premature
inferences and applications from these neuroimaging data to individuals in real-life settings without sufficient support.27 And many
courts have permitted such evidence to be admitted.
There are four categorical concerns that courts might consider in
determining legal expertise relating to neuroimaging evidence involving behavioral science data. The first is the proper scope of medical
expertise with respect to neuroimaging, which generally involves such
specialties as neurology, radiology, neuroradiology, internal medicine,
and psychiatry. As one commentator noted when discussing the complicated subspecialty boundaries of existing medicine, “[c]onsidering
that neuroimaging technologies require specialized training in operation and interpretation, [and] assertions of expertise about the
brain . . . questions arise as to who can speak authoritatively about
23.

NIMH Strategic Plan for Research: Objective 2, NIMH, https://
www.nimh.nih.gov/about/strategic-planning-reports/strategic-objective-2.sh
tml [https://perma.cc/P969-NNCV] (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).

24.

See generally Kapur et al., supra, note 16.

25.

Farah & Gillihan, supra note 21, at 31; Anderson & Illes, supra, note 21, at
42.

26.

See generally Gary B. Melton et al., Psychological Evaluations
for the Courts: A Handbook for Mental Health Professionals
and Lawyers (3d ed. 2007). For more on the concept of group-toindividual application from various disciplines to be used in court, see
David L. Faigman et al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific
Expert Testimony, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (2014).

27.

C.C Meltzer et al., Guidelines for the Ethical Use of Neuroimages in
Medical Testimony: Report of a Multidisciplinary Consensus Conference,
35 Am. J. of Neuroradiology 632, 632 (2014); Rushing, Pyrma, &
Langleben, supra note 19, at 22; Jones et al., supra note 9, at 17629;
Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States,
62 Stan. L. Rev. 1119, 1199 (2010); Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes,
Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33
Am. J.L. & Med. 377, 420 (2007).
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the relationship between the brain and behavior . . . .”28 While a
neuroradiologist may be well qualified to testify about a neuroimaging
study as a diagnostic tool for a neurodegenerative disease, she may be
less qualified than a physician who treats patients with such disease
to address the common behaviors associated with that disease process.
Yet, both may have sufficient qualifications to serve as expert witnesses, given the breadth of a medical training.
The second concern is the comparative types of expertise among
the non-medical professions who may testify about neuroimaging
evidence in behavioral science cases. Those potential experts may
include neuroscientists, clinical psychologists, neuropsychologists, research psychologists, and others, each of whom has a specific scope of
expertise.
The third issue involving expertise depends upon whether the
neuroimaging evidence is based on group data generally;29 group data
as applied to an individual;30 or individual data applied either in a
diagnostic fashion or to explain or excuse behavior.31 While certain
experts specializing in research may be qualified to testify about group
data generally, those experts may not be qualified to testify about the
diagnostic application of data to groups or more significantly, to
individuals. Conversely, other experts, such as non-academic
neuroradiologists, might be well-qualified to address diagnostic MRI
28.

Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture, and Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J.
Am Acad. Psych. & L. 239, 241 (2009).

29.

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). All three cases
involved the use of neuroscience data in amicus briefs to support other
scientific and psychological evidence submitted in the case indicating that
adolescent minds differed from adult minds in multiple ways. See, e.g.,
Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, and National Association of Social Workers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 25–31, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)
(Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (arguing that neuroscience suggests a possible
physiological basis for fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds). For more on the various roles of neuroscience experts in the legal
system, see Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 Nature
Revs. Neurosci. 730 (2013).

30.

See generally Faigman et al., supra note 26; Carl E. Fisher et al., Toward a
Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining the Challenges of
Reasoning from Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual Decisions in the
Law, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 685 (2015); see also Manish A. Fozdar, The
Relevance of Modern Neuroscience to Forensic Psychiatry Practice, 44 J.
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 145, 147 (2013) (discussing the application
of studies in a large group to a particular case).

31.

Much neuroimaging sought to be used in court falls into this category. See
Jane Campbell Moriarty et al., Brain Trauma, PET Scans and Forensic
Complexity, 31 Behav. Sci. & L. 701, 708–09 (2013).
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imaging of an individual but not qualified to testify about the design
of fMRI studies.
The fourth issue relating to expertise is determined by the specific
imaging modality: Who is qualified to order, administer, and interpret
the data? While most neuroimaging modalities are in the realm of
medical diagnostics, as explained above, fMRI has been used largely
in basic research often led by non-physicians in an academic setting.
However, despite PET and MRI being in the domains of diagnostic
radiology and nuclear medicine respectively, a variety of non-radiologists and non-physicians have relied on these modalities in research
and have been asked to testify about interpretations of these images.32

II. Scientific Evidence
Courts have long wrestled with science and experts in deciding
cases and controversies, with some degree of success but certainly
with some notable errors.33 During the twentieth century, as scientific
and expert evidence began to became more prominent in both civil
and criminal litigation, many voiced concerns about the quality of
scientific evidence admitted in the courts and the appropriate scope of
expertise.34 These concerns precipitated the so-called Daubert trilogy
and the amendment to Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 702.35 This
32.

See id. at 708, 713–14 (discussing the use of PET scan evidence to support
claims of both traumatic brain injury and aberrant behavior not related to
Alzheimer’s disease).

33.

Robin Feldman, The Role of Science in Law 148 (2009).

34.

For more about the mid-century critiques of scientific evidence, see
Giannelli, supra note 3, at 1208–28. For a detailed history of scientific
evidence, see Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert
Testimony, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 879 (2008).

35.

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999). Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides as follows:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
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decisional shift and rule change have been part of the ongoing effort
“to exorcise charlatanism and differentiate good science from bad”36 in
the courtroom; a lofty but challenging task.
The Daubert trilogy of Supreme Court decisions governing the
admission of expert evidence in federal cases was intended to sharpen
courts’ focus on the quality of such evidence, requiring judges serve as
the gatekeepers of expert evidence, sifting the evidentiary wheat from
chaff—a daunting task for judges “largely untrained in science.”37 As
part of this gatekeeping, courts have occasionally been guided by
amicus briefs from groups of experts and, infrequently, by independently-retained court experts or science panels.38 Typically, however,
courts rely on competing partisan experts, colorfully described as “the
legal system’s [attempt] to grind truth from between the abrasive
surfaces of two opposing parties . . . .”39 A court’s grasp of a given
field of science and the requisite level of expertise required is often
only as good as the messengers before them. It is a difficult task for
courts to understand the boundaries of expertise in the area of neuroimaging evidence, particularly when the lawyers also may not understand the proper roles of various experts.
The use of mental health experts—currently psychiatrists and
psychologists—to testify as experts on sanity, cognitive impairment,
legal competence, and other matters in criminal cases has a long
history in both U.S. courts and English common law.40 Mental health
experts frequently testify at all stages of the criminal proceeding, from
competency hearings through capital case penalty phase hearings to
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Sections (a)–(c) were added in 2000 to reflect the
Daubert trilogy and other cases. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s
note to 2000 amendment.
36.

Golan, supra note 34, at 942.

37.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).

38.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; Fed. R. Evid. 706(a); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E.
Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for CourtAppointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 Emory L.J. 995,
995 (1994); see Andrew W. Jurs, Science Court: Past Proposals, Current
Considerations, and a Suggested Structure, 15 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1, 18–23
(2010). Improving methods for evaluating expert testimony is not a new
concept. As Professor Tal Golan explains, nearly all the reform proposals of
the twentieth-century are traceable back to the nineteenth century. Golan,
supra note 34, at 937.

39.

Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, supra note 29, at 732.

40.

Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 51, 75–85
(2006); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 404–07 (1993) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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provide critical, necessary testimony.41 Yet, as long recognized, factfinders are skeptical of expert testimony used to explain a defendant’s
past mental state and overwhelmingly discount the testimony of defense psychiatric and psychological experts.42 Given this skepticism,
defendants eagerly embraced functional neuroimaging to provide more
compelling and “objective” proof of mental health impairments that
might be regarded more favorably by juries, although questions
remain about the relative success of such efforts.43

III. Neuroimaging Evidence
Over the last decade, neuroimaging evidence has become
increasingly prevalent in criminal cases. Empirical studies demonstrate that neuroimaging is often admitted as mitigating evidence in
sentencing, competency hearings, and during trial as part of the
defense.44 Courts have frequently admitted nuclear medicine-based
studies, including PET and SPECT in criminal trials on a range of
mental health issues, both in the guilt phase of trials and in

41.

The authors offer no opinion on the expertise of mental health expert
witnesses who are testifying about matters other than structural and
functional neuroimaging, although they recognize that there are
contentious issues this subject also presents. Psychiatrists and psychologists
are well-qualified to address many critical mental health matters in court.

42.

Jane Campbell Moriarty, Seeing Voices: Potential Neuroscience
Contributions to a Reconstruction of Legal Insanity, 86 Fordham L. Rev.
599, 613 (2016); Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable:
The Role of Law, Science, and Speculation in Adjudicating
Culpability and Dangerousness (2007); Michael L. Perlin, The
Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense 144–45 (1994).

43.

See Michael L. Perlin, “And I See Through Your Brain”: Access to
Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic
Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009
Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 4, 4; O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the
“Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1270
(2007). But see generally Farahany, supra note 14, at 507–08 (discussing
the relative success of such evidence).

44.

See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An
Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L.
Rev. 493, 504 (2015) (discussing the use of neuroscience evidence in the
guilt and sentencing phases of criminal cases and noting its frequent use as
mitigation); Farahany, supra note 14 (documenting the rising use of
neurobiological research for purposes of competency, guilt, and mitigation);
Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging
Evidence in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 Drake L. Rev. 577, 661 (2016)
(concluding that evidence has been admitted in the guilt phase, penalty
phase, and in competency hearings).
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sentencing,45 and fMRI expert evidence has been admitted as additional proof of psychopathy.46 While the use of such evidence may
have promise to improve legal decision making on issues of mental
health, the use of such evidence has been described as “haphazard, ad
hoc, and often ill conceived.”47
While neuroscience research has grown exponentially over the last
decades,48 the number of publications about neuroscience and law,
sometimes termed “neurolaw,” has also increased dramatically.49 Much
of the academic scholarship has been devoted to questioning the
reliability and relevance of neuroimaging evidence,50 with less

45.

See Nita Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 351, 374
(2012); Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 Minn. L.
Rev. 2036, 2064–66 (2013); Moriarty et al., supra note 31, at 708–09
(discussing the use of PET scans as evidence in cases involving brain
damage, toxic exposure, or illness).

46.

Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: Head Case, 464 Nature 340, 340
(2010). For reported cases disallowing fMRI evidence related to lie
detection, see Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 642 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010); United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir.
2012).

47.

Farahany, supra note 14, at 488–89.

48.

See generally Bandettini, supra note 15 (discussing the history, growth,
and discoveries of fMRI research during the preceding twenty-year period).

49.

The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography from the website of The
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience
includes a graph indicating far less than 200 such publications by 2005,
nearly 1,100 such publications by 2012, and roughly 1,700 by 2017.
Cumulative Total of Law and Neuroscience Publications: 1984–2017, Law
& Neurosci., http://www.lawneuro.org/bibliography/bibliography2017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/STH9-RKH5] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018) [hereinafter
The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography]; see also Francis X. Shen, The
Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging Field of
Neurolaw, 38 Int’l J. Legal Info. 352, 358 (2010).

50.

For a small sample of the scholarship, see, for example, Henry T. Greely &
Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 747, 776 (3d ed. 2011); The Law and
Neuroscience Bibliography, supra note 49; Katherine Shats et al., Don’t
Ask a Neuroscientist About Phases of the Moon: Applying Appropriate
Evidence Law to the Use of Neuroscience in the Courtroom, 25
Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 712, 712 (2016); C.C. Meltzer et al.,
supra note 27, at 635; Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty,
Using Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law and Research
Policy Collide, 19 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y L. 222 (2013); Francis X. Shen &
Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and
Lessons, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 861, 862 (2011); Brown & Murphy, supra
note 27, at 1131–32.
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attention devoted to the question of expert qualifications in this
emerging and multidisciplinary field.51
Most of the academic analysis about functional neuroimaging evidence arises from the Daubert trilogy’s focus on methods used in
research, the relationship and distance between data and conclusions,
and the “fit” of the proposed testimony to the issue in dispute.52 To
date, little attention has been given to the role of expert qualifications
in most scholarship, both because witness expertise historically has
been a low hurdle,53 and because of the more acute concerns about
legal reliability and the profound implications of such evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the template for most state evidence rules, provides that a witness may be qualified as an expert by
“knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”54 Written in the
disjunctive, the rule permits an expert to be qualified in multiple ways
and envisions various types of expertise.55 Generally, however, there is
51.

Publications raising the topic of neuroimaging expertise in practice or in
forensic settings include Purvak Patel et al., The Role of Imaging in United
States Courtrooms, 17 Neuroimaging Clinics N. Am. 557, 560 (2007);
Neil K. Aggarwal, Neuroimaging, Culture, and Forensic Psychiatry, 37 J.
Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 239, 241 (2009); Elizabeth Ford & Neil
Aggarwal, Neuroethics of Functional Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, in
Neuroimaging in Forensic Psychiatry: From the Clinic to the
Courtroom 325, 331–32 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012); Andreana
Benitez et al., Neuroimaging Training Among Neuropsychologists: A
Survey of the State of Current Training and Recommendations for
Trainees, 28 Clinical Neuropsychol. 600 (2014) (discussing the benefits
neuroimaging training could have in preparing neuroscientists to serve as
expert witnesses); Christina T. Liu, Note, Scanning the Evidence: The
Evidentiary Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony on MRI Brain
Scans in Civil Cases in the Post-Daubert Era, 70 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 479, 518–19 (2015).

52.

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.

53.

Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic
Competence, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 1009, 1016–17 (2008) (explaining that as
a matter of historical review, judges rarely interrogated experts’ bona fides
in a rigorous manner, and such decisions were “virtually unreviewable on
appeal”); see also David Faigman et al., Modern Scientific
Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 22:9 (2017–
2018 ed.) (stating that “[t]raditionally, all but the grossly unqualified
experts were permitted to testify under Rule 702,” but noting the change
in many post-Daubert cases where experts have been rejected on the basis
of their lack of qualifications).

54.

See supra note 35, setting forth FRE 702.

55.

The Advisory Committee notes to FRE 702 provides:
The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited
merely to the “scientific” and “technical” but extend to all
“specialized” knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a
narrow sense, but as a person qualified by “knowledge, skill,
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a discernable relationship between an expert’s qualifications and
expertise: The more technical the specialized knowledge and the less
comprehensible it is to the jury, the more likely the court is to be
demanding about qualifications.56 The nature of the expert’s opinion
will determine the required qualifications, whether academic or experiential, but it should rise to a “meaningful threshold of expertise.”57
Recognizing that expertise is often a question of weight of the
evidence rather than admissibility, some courts have set the bar exceptionally low for qualifications, stating that experts need only
“possess skill or knowledge greater than the average layman.”58 Other
courts opine that experts need to be neither “blue-ribbon practitioners” with “optimal qualification[s],”59 nor even “highly qualified in
order to testify about a given issue.”60 Despite the rhetoric, many
courts in the post-Daubert era have employed a more rigorous standard, often in complex civil cases involving medical device and
malpractice61 or in toxic tort cases.62
With respect to the expert testimony of physicians, courts
currently scrutinize qualifications for specialties and are mindful of
limiting the testimony of experts to questions within their specialized
medical area and knowledge.63 While non-physicians, such as nurses,
experience, training or education.” Thus within the scope of the
rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g.,
physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group
sometimes called “skilled” witnesses, such as bankers or landowners
testifying to land values.
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1303
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
56.

Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 Houston L.
Rev. 743, 759 (1999), citing 2 Stephen Saltzburg et al., Federal
Rules of Evidence Manual 1220 (7th ed. 1998).

57.

Prado Alvarez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Inc., 405 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir.
2005).

58.

Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Waldorf
v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998)).

59.

United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 262 (1st Cir. 2006).

60.

Huss v. Gaydon, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009).

61.

See, e.g., Ralston v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 275 F.3d 965, 969–74
(10th Cir. 2001).

62.

See Faigman et al., supra note 53, § 22:9.

63.

See, e.g., Rheinfrank v. Abbott Labs., 680 F. App’x 369, 380 (6th Cir.,
2017) (noting that several courts have “limited the testimony of medical
experts to questions within their specialized medical ken”); see also
Mathison v. Moats, 812 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that a prison
doctor was not qualified as an expert on cardiology); Warren v. Tastove,
240 F. App’x 771 (10th Cir. 2007) (upholding trial court decision to
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scientists, and psychologists may be allowed to testimony about issues
related to medicine, they are often prohibited from providing testimony that is considered to be within the sole expertise of physicians.64
Thus, medical diagnoses, medical causation, and the need for and interpretation of medical tests are largely in the domain of physicians,65
although there are exceptions.66 And the substantial overlap between
psychiatry and psychology expertise presents complicated questions as
well.
The wide-ranging pursuits of the neuroscience field include
intersecting and often overlapping areas of expertise among psychologists, research scientists, and various categories of physicians. Yet,
lawyers and judges are not always aware—nor could they be—of the
general boundaries of expertise and the precise boundaries of expertise
in a given matter on a specific issue.
The well-credentialed researchers producing neuroimaging data
might seem to be qualified as experts in court, given their extensive
knowledge of the studies, methods used, data generated, study limitations, and error rates; and to the extent that is the scope of their
testimony, they are likely well-qualified. But the analysis becomes
difficult when one separates the question of knowledge of neuroimaging research from the diagnostic use of such evidence in a given

exclude testimony by orthopedic surgeon on whether the plaintiff could
resume his former vocation); Brown, supra note 56, at 766–67 (noting the
trend toward specific expertise, but recognizing exceptions to that rule).
64.

See Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys., Inc., 822 F.3d 194, 200 (5th
Cir. 2016).

65.

See, e.g., Edmonds v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 910 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir.
1990) (deciding that a clinical psychologist, with “specialized training in
the application of psychological principles to the assessment and treatment
of people with psychological problems” was not qualified to testify about
whether stress worsened a plaintiff’s coronary artery disease. “[He] is not a
medical doctor, and he is not involved in making medical diagnoses or
ordering medical studies or tests. . . [this] is a medical issue that is plainly
beyond this witness's expertise in the field of psychology”); Kellar v. Willis,
186 F. App’x 714 (8th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing between the practice of
medicine and psychological expertise).

66.

Moreover, the growing reliance upon nurse practitioners, physician
assistants, and others in medicine may well change concepts of expertise.
For more, see Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Health Care System:
Regulation of Alternative Health Care Providers, 32 Houston L. Rev.
1273 (1996) (discussing the growth and use of so-called alternative
practitioners), and Thomas R. McLean, The Schizophrenia of Physician
Extender Utilization, 20 Annals of Health L. 205 (2011) (discussing the
role of physician extenders, such as nurse practitioners and physician
assistants).
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individual.67 Evaluating the proposed testimony vis-à-vis the matter
at issue, i.e., the “task at hand,”68 presents difficult questions of legal
expertise in cases involving functional neuroimaging of an individual.
Three categories of professionals—physicians, psychologists, and
doctoral-level research scientists—usually conduct functional
neuroimaging research that relates to mental health issues. These
doctoral-level scientists design the studies and oversee data collection,
review the statistical analysis, and draft the findings, usually in the
form of publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals. The research
scientists may have degrees in one of many subspecialties of psychology, a PhD in a biomedical field such as Neuroscience, Physiology,
Chemistry, Physics, or even Computer Science and Engineering. As
many research scientists are far removed from the actual clinical
practice of medicine or even psychology that may employ such research, their qualifications are usually insufficient to discuss the
applicability of the research studies to an individual case. As a general
matter, non-physician researchers are not qualified or licensed to prescribe or interpret functional neuroimages diagnostically. Thus,
application of those studies to a given individual—which is often at
issue in legal disputes—is generally outside of their area of
competence.69
In the US, physicians receive a doctor of medicine (“M.D.”)
degree from an accredited school of medicine, followed by a residency
training in one of about thirty recognized medical specialties, such as
radiology, and often with additional fellowship training in a subspecialty, such as neuroradiology.70 Physicians are licensed by a state
to practice medicine, without distinction between specialties, so that
from a licensing perspective, a radiologist could practice psychiatry
without completing a residency training in psychiatry and vice versa.
In reality, physicians are bound to practice within their specialty by
their hospital bylaws and malpractice insurance.
Probably the largest category of doctoral level professionals who
engage in both neuroimaging research and clinical practice are the
67.

For more on the difference between diagnostic and framework expertise,
see supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.

68.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993); see also
Giannelli, supra note 2, § 5:03, noting that an expert may be qualified in
one aspect of a scientific technique but not qualified in another.

69.

Those scientists, however, may be well-credentialed to explain data
generated from studies for controversies in court, as occurred with criminal
cases involving juveniles, referenced in note 29, supra.

70.

About Us, Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., http:
//www.acgme.org/About-Us/Overview [https://perma.cc/E54Y-UNWV]
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
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clinical psychologists. Unlike research scientists, and similar to
physicians, psychologists need to be licensed in a state in order to
treat patients; unlike physicians, they are primarily trained in nonpharmacological treatments71 for mental and behavioral disorders, i.e.,
psychotherapy and psychological testing.
Of the various types of professionals involved in neuroimaging
research, only physicians are actually licensed by a jurisdiction in
which they practice to order a diagnostic imaging study and provide a
diagnostic interpretation of such study, because both referral and
interpretation constitute practice of medicine. Clinical psychologists
are also qualified to diagnose and provide therapy to patients, and
many are qualified to perform psychological testing of various types.72
While clinical psychologists may rely on a physician’s interpretation
of medical images, neither they nor research scientists are generally
qualified to interpret those images. Thus, they could not opine whether a brain area on a PET scan using radioactive glucose tracer is abnormally hypometabolic and has clinical significance or requires
medical treatment.
There are, however, overlapping areas of expertise and differing
opinion about the roles of psychiatrists and psychologists both in and
out of the courtroom. As many psychological and neuroscience researchers spend most of their careers using functional neuroimaging,
they often have greater knowledge of the functional neuroimaging
research than those practicing psychiatrists, neurologists, and radiologists who do little or no neuroimaging research. Given these complementary areas of expertise, in is not surprising that courts are not
focusing on the distinctions among physicians, clinical psychologists,
and research scientists. While all three specialties might be qualified
to testify about aspects of functional neuroimaging, there are limits to
each profession’s qualifications.
The scope of clinical psychologist’s area of expertise has also
become more complex over time. The American Psychological
Association has developed a recognized subspecialty of Clinical
Neuropsychology for doctoral-level psychologists, which raises another
legal issue of relative spheres of expertise between clinical psychologists and neuropsychologists. However, as noted in a survey of those
professionals, the neuroimaging training among those clinical neuropsychologists is widely divergent, raising further questions about what
training constitutes sufficient courtroom qualifications to testify about
neuroimaging.73 While the authors of that article recommend training
71.

Some states have begun to license psychotherapists to prescribe
psychoactive medication. Melton et al., supra note 26, at 23.

72.

Id. at 23–24.

73.

Benitez et al., supra note 51, at 5–6.
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in neuroimaging, they recognize that “no established guidelines exist
for neuroimaging training among neuropsychologists.”74 Moreover,
some of the psychologists who testify about the meaning of neuroimages have only a masters’ level degree. Thus, there are serious
questions about the specific qualifications that would qualify a psychologist to testify about neuroimages.
To date, some courts have allowed non-physicians to testify in a
diagnostic fashion about structural and functional neuroimaging, generally not addressing the question of expertise. For example, in Black
v. Bell,75 the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death.76 He subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus; part of
which rested on a claim of mental retardation pursuant to Atkins v.
Virginia,77 which prohibits the execution of mentally retarded individuals.78 As part of his proof, the petitioner introduced the
testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, both of whom reviewed
MRI and PET scans and concluded that the defendant had “extensive
brain damage that was likely caused by his mother’s drinking alcohol
while pregnant, but might also have been caused by other occurrences
during his childhood.”79 The court did not comment on the relative
qualifications of the experts but did grant defendant’s petition to
remand on the basis of Atkins.80
In Simmons v. State,81 two defense psychologists testified in a
post-conviction hearing about possible mental health evidence, based
upon a PET scan of defendant’s brain.82 One testified that the PET
scan confirmed his opinion that the defendant had brain damage that
led to a lifetime of impulsivity, behavioral problems, and a “sort of
pervasive maladjustment.”83 The other testified that the PET scan
showed “unilateral hypometabolism in a key structure in the middle
of the brain called the thalamus,” and testified that the defendant’s
cognitive impairment, dyslexia, impulsive behavior and acting out
were consistent with thalamic dysfunction.84 The prosecution expert
74.

Id. at 8.

75.

664 F.3d 81 (6th Cir. 2011).

76.

Id. at 82.

77.

536 U.S. 304 (2002).

78.

Id. at 304.

79.

Black, 664 F.3d at 88.

80.

Id. at 101.

81.

105 So. 3d 475 (Fla. 2012).

82.

Id. at 505.

83.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

84.

Id.
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was a physician who was board-certified, i.e., residency-trained, in
both Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear Medicine and a Professor of
Radiology.85 He testified that the PET scan, including the thalamus,
was within normal range, and that PET cannot be used with any
degree of reliability to diagnose behavioral problems.86 Perhaps paradoxically, the court’s expressed concern about expertise only related
to the physician testifying about behavior—without recognizing that
the physician may have been the only one among the witnesses
qualified to testify both about abnormalities on individual PET scans
and their clinical significance.87
In a federal death penalty case, the defense sought to introduce
diagnostic testimony from an expert who was both a clinical
psychologist and a distinguished researcher to discuss an MRI and
PET scan as proof of the defendant’s underlying mental illness.88 The
reliability of the PET scan evidence was challenged by the government’s experts, one of whom was a practicing neurologist with fellowship training in nuclear medicine.89 The court ultimately barred the
PET scan evidence on reliability grounds but did not address the
issue of whether the experts were sufficiently qualified to testify about
PET scan evidence.90
In another capital case, an influential research psychologist
testified during the sentencing phase that the defendant’s fMRI results were consistent with psychopathy, based upon his extensive
fMRI research91 and the fMRI testing of the defendant he had conducted.92 Uniquely in that case, the expert testifying had a doctorate
in both neuroscience and psychology, was a recognized expert in clinical psychology involving the diagnosis of psychopathy, and had
published extensive peer-reviewed research to correlate fMRI data
with psychological diagnoses of psychopathy. Most experts, however,
do not bring to the court such extensive expertise. And while such
“blue ribbon” expertise is not the standard in courts, there should be
better guidelines to determine who is, and who is not, qualified to
assist the finder of fact in making a decision.

85.

Id. at 506.

86.

Id.

87.

Id.

88.

United States v. Montgomery. 635 F.3d 1074, 1082 (8th Cir. 2011).

89.

Id. at 1088.

90.

Id. at 1083.

91.

Hughes, supra note 46, at 340–41.

92.

Id. at 340.
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In some cases, physicians testify about the abnormalities on PET
scans while clinical psychologists testify about the mental health implications of the neuroimages or testify that the images support their
psychological diagnosis. While this approach avoids the non-physician
directly evaluating a PET scan, it addresses neither the concern that
functional neuroimages have very limited applications in clinical
psychiatry93 nor the questions presented about non-physicians testifying diagnostically about neuroimages.

Recommendations and Conclusion
In his 1998 article in Science, Justice Breyer states that “[t]he law
must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically
sound knowledge . . . . There is an increasingly important need for
law to reflect sound science.”94 Science, law, and medicine have
different purposes and methods and assess certainty in varying ways.
In the courtroom they are interdependent, with clinical medicine often
mediating between law and biological science. In the case of neuroimaging, the rapid growth of science has been producing new
information faster than clinical medicine could test and learn. Medical
and psychological training curricula may need to devote greater attention to the emerging imaging technologies even before they are
adopted, and medical and clinical specialties need to govern their
members about the proper role of specialization when testifying in
court.95
For testimony involving structural imaging such as MRI, CAT, xray and nuclear medicine techniques including PET and SPECT, we
believe that a medical degree is critical for diagnostically-based
93.

See Farah & Gillihan, supra note 21, at 2 (“Aside from its use to rule out
potential medical causes of a patient’s condition, for example a brain
tumor, neuroimaging is not used in the process of psychiatric diagnosis.”).

94.

Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 280 Sci. 537,
537–38 (1998).

95.

Professor Jennifer Bard explains why experts giving opinions on future
dangerousness in capital cases do not have a data-based premise for their
opinions, noting a lack of “peer-reviewed, published research based on a
study of defendants who have been convicted of a capital crime and are
facing the death penalty.” Jennifer S. Bard, Diagnosis Dangerous: Why
State Licensing Boards Should Step in to Prevent Mental Health
Practitioners from Speculating Beyond the Scope of Professional
Standards, 2015 Utah L. Rev. 929, 947. She urges both American
Psychiatric and American Psychological Associations to require state
licensing boards to assure that these experts do not testify beyond the
scope of medical support or evidence. Id. at 929. The authors agree that
the licensing boards could have a strong normative effect on the scope of
expert’s testimony.
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expertise and a relevant subspecialty of radiology, neuroradiology or
nuclear medicine is preferred. Professional Radiology and Nuclear
Medicine societies anticipate that PET and SPECT scan are ordered
and interpreted by physicians with appropriate qualifications and
experience in the field and make no provisions for involvement of nonphysicians other than qualified technicians performing the scans.96
With respect to fMRI, the issue is more complicated and the role
of expertise more clouded. As noted above, with the exception of
dementia, fMRI is not used in clinical psychiatry and the only clinical
application of fMRI recognized by the American College of Radiology
(“ACR”) appears to be pre-surgical mapping of brain function. Much
of the research using fMRI is undertaken by psychologists in academic
settings, with physicians only reviewing scans for incidental findings.97
As fMRI is used for foundational research, the scope of expertise for
those researchers would likely extend to the data and interpretation of
those research studies.
The principles governing other forms of functional neuroimaging
would suggest that diagnostic fMRI is in the domain of medicine.
However, fMRI in many cases requires the patient to perform, during
the scan, a standardized task variably referred to as “neurofunctional”
or “activation” task that generates a motor, sensory or language
function of interest, such as finger-tapping. According to American
Medical Association’s (“AMA”) Current Procedural Terminology
(“CPT”) codes created for fMRI in 2007, both physicians and clinical
psychologists may administer and interpret fMRI studies that involve
such “neurofunctional testing.”98 This suggests that the AMA CPT
panel considers these two professions interchangeable in at least some
parts of the fMRI domain. However, since this CPT is intended for
96.

See ACR Practice Parameter for Performing and Interpreting Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI), Am. C. Radiology (2017), https://www.
acr.org/-/media/ACR/Files/Practice-Parameters/mr-perf-interpret.pdf?la=
en [https://perma.cc/TU53-67GD]; ACR-ASNR-SPR Practice Parameter
for the Performance and Interpretation of Magnetic Resonance Imaging of
the Brain, Am. C. of Radiology (Res. 6–2013) https://www.acr.org//media/ACR/Files/Practice-Parameters/mr-brain.pdf?la=en [https://perma.
cc/2XMG-5GW2]; The SNM Procedure Guideline for General Imaging
V6.0, Soc’y Nuclear Med. (2010), http://interactive.snm.org/docs/
General_Imaging_Version_6.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM6M-W4KS].

97.

For more on issues related to incidental findings from MRI and fMRI
studies, see Kyoko Takashima et al., Discovery and Informing Research
Participants of Incidental Findings Detected in Brain Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Studies: Review and Multi-Institutional Study, Brain & Behav.,
May 2017.

98.

John Hart, Jr., M.D., et al., Clinical Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 20 Cognitive Behavioral Neurology 141, 141–44 (2007).
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brain mapping prior to surgery,99 this does not indicate a general
endorsement of non-physicians ordering or interpreting fMRI of individuals outside of recognized medical indications.
For their part, the courts’ analysis of functional neuroimaging
would be helped if they had a clearer understanding of the academic
and professional structure of the interrelated fields that produce the
neuroimaging science. While courts will continue to rely on the
“dueling experts” model, we believe that there are additional routes to
provide scientific and medical guidance to the courts, including the
use of consensus opinions by professionals in the various fields.
As a result of the Daubert trilogy, The Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence, the many programs presented on Science for
Judges, the Supreme Court’s encouragement to appoint independent
experts,100 and the proposed use of Science Panels for complex litigation,101 there has been much effort to improve the communication
between science, medicine, and law. But as is widely agreed, most of
these suggested methods to improve the communication have not been
as successful as hoped. There is more to be done.
Another critical way to help bridge the divisions among science,
medicine and law is greater reliance upon practice guidelines of the
relevant professional groups, such as the AMA, the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the
ACR, and the Society of Nuclear Medicine (“SNM”), as well as
recommendations by specially convened conferences such as the
Consensus Report of the Working Group on Psychiatry.102
With hope, this trend will continue. When experts can reach
consensus on a variety of issues, courts are provided with
epistemically competent information by which to evaluate the experts
in their courtrooms. There should be greater discussion among
psychiatric and psychological societies on the role of functional
neuroimaging for mental health-related issues. Such a collaboration
would be of great use to the courts and could improve the quality of
judicial gatekeeping with respect to expertise.

99.

Id. at 144.

100. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)
(stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence have a “permissive backdrop”
for expert testimony); Fed. R. Evid. 706.
101. Jurs, supra, note 38, at 18–19.
102. We also echo Professor Bard’s suggestion that licensing bodies could have
more input into overseeing the proper limits of expert witness testimony.
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